

AFRICAN UNION

Formal Background Guide and Position Sheet

Extraordinary Summit, 2027

Topic: The Validity of Somaliland's Claim to Statehood and Recognition

Committee Type	African Union Extraordinary Assembly / Emergency Summit
Format	Advanced / Crisis-capable Model UN committee
Freeze Date	15 March 2027, 10:00 EAT (fictional scenario)
Voting Members	55 African Union member states
Intended Use	Delegate background guide, dais reference, and state position sheet

Note to Delegates

This guide presents a fictional 2027 African Union emergency summit created for educational Model UN use. Real-world African Union institutions, legal principles, and the long-running Somaliland question are used as reference points, but the emergency developments in this guide are fictional and designed for simulation. Delegates should treat the committee as a fast-moving political and legal crisis rather than a purely historical discussion.

1. Committee Mandate and Agenda

The African Union bears collective responsibility for preserving continental peace, defending sovereign equality, and managing disputes in a manner consistent with African legal and political norms. In this committee, delegates must respond to an extraordinary legitimacy crisis triggered by renewed international attention to Somaliland's claim to statehood and by growing pressure on the African Union to clarify whether that claim is legally, politically, and strategically valid.

The central task of the committee is not to revisit the Horn of Africa in the abstract, but to determine what the African Union should do under severe diplomatic pressure. Delegates should be prepared to debate territorial integrity, colonial borders, remedial secession arguments, democratic legitimacy, regional security, AU precedent, international recognition, Red Sea geopolitics, and the institutional consequences of either maintaining or revising the Union's long-standing position.

Primary agenda item: African Union Deliberation on the Validity of Somaliland's Claim to Statehood and Recognition.

2. The African Union Extraordinary Summit in 2027: Membership and Procedure

For the purposes of this committee, the African Union convenes an extraordinary emergency session composed of all 55 member states, chaired under AU summit procedure. Every member state holds one vote. The committee membership is as follows.

Category	Member	Voting Note
AU Leadership	Chairperson of the African Union	Full vote
AU Leadership	Deputy Chairperson / Procedural Vice-Chair	Full vote
Regional Delegations	All 55 African Union member states	Full vote
Observers	AU Commission legal advisers, IGAD, invited UN and RECs observers	No vote unless granted by dais

The voting membership is organized by region as follows.

Region	Voting Members
Central Africa	Burundi; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Chad; Republic of the Congo; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Equatorial Guinea; Gabon; São Tomé and Príncipe
Eastern Africa	Comoros; Djibouti; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Kenya; Madagascar; Mauritius; Rwanda; Seychelles; Somalia; South Sudan; Sudan; Tanzania; Uganda
Northern Africa	Algeria; Egypt; Libya; Mauritania; Morocco; Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic; Tunisia
Southern Africa	Angola; Botswana; Eswatini; Lesotho; Malawi; Mozambique; Namibia; South Africa; Zambia; Zimbabwe
Western Africa	Benin; Burkina Faso; Cabo Verde; Côte d'Ivoire; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Liberia; Mali; Niger; Nigeria; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Togo

Somaliland representatives, the Federal Government of Somalia, IGAD, and selected international partners may be invited to address the chamber without a vote under emergency hearing procedures.

Basic procedural reminders

- Any final summit decision requires a simple majority of member states present and voting unless the dais imposes a higher legitimacy threshold.
- Consensus outcomes are politically preferable because a narrow result on recognition would signal continental division and weaken implementation.
- Delegates should distinguish between legal assessment, political recommendation, and operational follow-up such as mediation, observer missions, or sanctions language.
- In a crisis committee, the Assembly may request emergency legal memoranda, boundary maps, precedent studies, and testimony from affected actors.

3. Historical Background to the Somaliland Question

3.1 Colonial borders, union, and collapse

The dispute over Somaliland is rooted in decolonization, post-colonial union, and state collapse. The territory corresponding to present-day Somaliland was formerly the British Somaliland Protectorate. It briefly achieved independence in June 1960 before voluntarily joining the former Trust Territory of Somalia in July 1960 to create the Somali Republic. Somaliland's modern legal argument rests heavily on the claim that the union was politically voluntary, legally defective, and later rendered void by dictatorship, atrocities, and state collapse.

From Mogadishu's perspective, however, Somalia remains one sovereign state whose territorial integrity is protected by African and international law. On this view, grievances, however serious, do not authorize unilateral secession, especially if recognition would destabilize existing borders and reward fragmentation.

3.2 Why the African Union has been cautious

The African Union and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, have long treated the maintenance of inherited colonial borders as a stabilizing principle. This norm was intended to prevent cascading border wars across the continent. Somaliland's advocates argue that their claim is unusual because they seek recognition within the boundaries of a former colonial entity rather than expansion beyond them. Even so, many African governments worry that any exception could be invoked by other separatist movements in very different circumstances.

The AU has also preferred Somali-led and regionally managed stabilization efforts. As a result, Somaliland has often been acknowledged as a political reality and a relatively stable de facto authority, while stopping short of formal recognition.

3.3 Why this debate matters internationally

The Somaliland question now intersects with maritime trade, Red Sea security, Gulf rivalries, democratic governance, counterterrorism, migration, and the credibility of the African Union itself. A formal AU shift would affect not only Somalia and Somaliland, but also continental norms on recognition, mediation, and state continuity. For this committee, the issue therefore combines law, security, diplomacy, precedent, and continental identity.

4. The 2027 Crisis Scenario

This committee uses a fictional 2027 crisis scenario: on 15 March 2027, the African Union convenes an extraordinary summit after a series of external diplomatic moves, commercial agreements, and security understandings have reopened the recognition question in a way the Union can no longer defer. The AU is under pressure to state whether Somaliland's claim has any legal or political validity within an African framework and, if so, what the Union should do next.

4.1 Why the issue has returned to the AU agenda

- A non-African state's recognition of Somaliland in late 2025 triggered a new diplomatic wave and sharpened demands for an authoritative African response.
- Somaliland has intensified lobbying across the continent, arguing that its elections, institutions, and long-term stability distinguish it from ordinary secessionist cases.
- Somalia has warned that any softening of AU language would violate its sovereignty and destabilize both the Horn of Africa and broader continental norms.

- Several member states now believe continued ambiguity is strategically worse than a clear collective position, even if the chamber remains divided over the answer.

4.2 Why the summit is high stakes

- A recognition debate inside the AU could reshape how the continent treats de facto states, peace settlements, and inherited borders.
- The Horn of Africa sits astride vital maritime routes, making any sovereignty dispute immediately relevant to security and commercial actors.
- Failure to produce a coherent position would damage the AU’s claim to provide African-led solutions to African political crises.

4.3 Timeline to freeze date

Date / Time	Event
December 2025	An external recognition of Somaliland prompts immediate condemnation from Somalia and a firm AU reaffirmation of Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity.
2026	Diplomatic debates intensify across Africa over whether the Union should keep strict non-recognition or open a formal legal review.
January 2027	Somaliland submits an emergency memorandum to the AU seeking a hearing on the validity of its statehood claim.
February 2027	A bloc of member states requests that the Chair convene an extraordinary summit to prevent unilateral continental fragmentation.
14 March 2027	Competing draft resolutions circulate: one rejects recognition categorically, one opens a conditional review process, and one proposes indefinite mediation without status change.
15 March 2027, 10:00 EAT	Freeze date: the African Union extraordinary summit convenes to determine whether Somaliland’s claim has any recognized validity and what follow-up action the Union will authorize.

5. Freeze-Date Situation Report

At the start of committee, the following conditions are assumed to exist:

Legal

- No African Union organ has recognized Somaliland as a sovereign member state.
- The chamber is divided between a strict territorial-integrity reading and a narrower argument that Somaliland may constitute a legally exceptional case.

Political

- Somalia insists the matter is non-negotiable and frames the summit as a test of the AU’s commitment to sovereignty.
- Some governments view Somaliland as a comparatively stable democratic actor and want at least a formal review, even if they do not yet support recognition.
- Other governments fear any opening will be cited by separatist movements elsewhere on the continent.

Security

- Red Sea access, port politics, and regional military alignments have made the question strategically more urgent than in earlier years.
- Delegates are concerned that either recognition or categorical rejection could alter security calculations in the Horn.

Reputational

- The AU is under scrutiny for appearing reactive while external powers shape the recognition debate around Africa rather than through Africa.
- The Union faces a credibility problem if the summit appears unable to articulate principles that distinguish this case from other border disputes.

6. Core Issues Before the Committee

Issue	Questions for Delegates
Legal validity	Does Somaliland satisfy the practical and legal indicators of statehood strongly enough to justify AU reconsideration, or is Somali territorial integrity dispositive?
Colonial borders	Should the AU interpret respect for borders at independence as supporting Somalia's current territorial integrity or Somaliland's claim to the former British Somaliland boundary?
Precedent risk	Would any recognition or review process create a dangerous continental precedent for other separatist movements?
Democratic legitimacy	How heavily should Somaliland's relative institutional stability, elections, and governance record weigh in the chamber's thinking?
Regional security	How should the Assembly factor in Red Sea strategy, port access, counterterrorism, and interstate rivalry in the Horn of Africa?
Mediation options	Should the AU maintain non-recognition, open structured talks on federal arrangements, or create a conditional pathway for legal review?
Recognition threshold	What formal guarantees, legal findings, and regional consultations would be required before any AU body could revisit recognition?
AU legitimacy	How can the chamber show that its decision is principled, African-led, and not merely a reaction to outside diplomatic pressure?

7. Member State Position Sheet

The following position notes are intended as a concise starting point for delegate research and in-committee strategy. They are not substitutes for deeper preparation. Delegates should speak from their assigned state perspective, not from these summaries alone.

Algeria

Strategic Interests: Continental legal order, anti-fragmentation norms, and protection of sovereignty.

Likely Priorities: Defend AU primacy, scrutinize precedent, and avoid externally driven recognition moves.

Red Lines: Any outcome that normalizes secession without a tightly bounded legal rationale.

Angola

Strategic Interests: Territorial stability, non-interference, and orderly continental diplomacy.

Likely Priorities: Preserve AU consensus and favor negotiation over unilateral recognition.

Red Lines: A rushed status shift that weakens sovereignty norms.

Benin

Strategic Interests: Rule-based multilateralism and institutional predictability.

Likely Priorities: Seek clear legal standards and avoid an ad hoc political compromise.

Red Lines: An ambiguous resolution that creates more questions than guidance.

Botswana

Strategic Interests: Governance credibility, legal clarity, and principled diplomacy.

Likely Priorities: Press for evidence-based debate, institutional standards, and transparent criteria.

Red Lines: Recognition based purely on geopolitics rather than law and governance.

Burkina Faso

Strategic Interests: State sovereignty, security management, and resistance to destabilizing precedent.

Likely Priorities: Emphasize territorial integrity and caution toward external influence.

Red Lines: Any formula that appears to reward fragmentation during wider security crises.

Burundi

Strategic Interests: Domestic stability, border certainty, and continental restraint.

Likely Priorities: Support sovereignty-first language and avoid expansive precedents.

Red Lines: A decision that weakens fixed-border norms.

Cabo Verde

Strategic Interests: Rules-based diplomacy, maritime stability, and AU credibility.

Likely Priorities: Encourage legal review and calm procedure while avoiding rhetorical escalation.

Red Lines: A chaotic summit result that leaves implementation undefined.

Cameroon

Strategic Interests: Territorial unity, constitutional order, and anti-secession precedent.

Likely Priorities: Defend Somalia's territorial integrity and limit room for separatist analogies.

Red Lines: Any resolution that could be read as legitimizing secession elsewhere.

Central African Republic

Strategic Interests: State continuity, external non-interference, and regime security.

Likely Priorities: Favor sovereignty language and collective AU discipline.

Red Lines: Recognition steps taken without overwhelming continental consensus.

Chad

Strategic Interests: Regional stability, border integrity, and executive-level crisis management.

Likely Priorities: Support caution, mediation, and firm respect for member-state sovereignty.

Red Lines: A status decision that spills instability across the Sahel-Horn political system.

Comoros

Strategic Interests: Territorial integrity and sensitivity to sovereignty disputes.

Likely Priorities: Resist precedent that could empower separatist claims.

Red Lines: Language that weakens the norm against territorial partition.

Republic of the Congo

Strategic Interests: Non-interference, continuity of states, and careful summit process.

Likely Priorities: Keep debate inside AU structures and avoid premature recognition talk.

Red Lines: External actors dictating the chamber's final line.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Strategic Interests: Protection against fragmentation, sovereign equality, and regional order.

Likely Priorities: Stress territorial integrity and tightly control any exception language.

Red Lines: Any AU formula easily repurposed by other armed or separatist actors.

Côte d'Ivoire

Strategic Interests: Institutional legitimacy, pragmatic diplomacy, and regional balance.

Likely Priorities: Look for a defensible middle path such as managed dialogue or technical review.

Red Lines: A polarized summit that produces an unworkable implementation mandate.

Djibouti

Strategic Interests: Horn of Africa balance, Red Sea security, and regional diplomatic leverage.

Likely Priorities: Prevent escalation, preserve Somali stability, and keep AU leadership central.

Red Lines: A decision that sharply militarizes or internationalizes the dispute.

Egypt

Strategic Interests: Red Sea security, state sovereignty, and opposition to destabilizing recognition precedents.

Likely Priorities: Back Somalia's territorial integrity and reject externally imposed recognition.

Red Lines: Any AU opening that appears to legitimize unilateral secession.

Equatorial Guinea

Strategic Interests: Executive sovereignty, non-interference, and institutional caution.

Likely Priorities: Support a conservative interpretation of borders and recognition.

Red Lines: An abrupt legal reinterpretation driven by outside pressure.

Eritrea

Strategic Interests: Strategic autonomy, regional leverage, and skepticism of externally scripted solutions.

Likely Priorities: Evaluate the issue through power realities and regional consequences rather than sentimental rhetoric.

Red Lines: An AU outcome that gives rival states strategic advantage without delivering stability.

Eswatini

Strategic Interests: Monarchical sovereignty, diplomatic caution, and procedural legitimacy.

Likely Priorities: Favor conservative legal readings and orderly summit management.

Red Lines: A precedent that appears to erode the permanence of internationally recognized borders.

Ethiopia

Strategic Interests: Sea access, Horn diplomacy, and strategic flexibility on Somaliland.

Likely Priorities: Push for debate on exceptional status, practical realities, and alternative political arrangements.

Red Lines: A resolution that closes all room for future legal or diplomatic reconsideration.

Gabon

Strategic Interests: Continental stability, sovereign equality, and predictable AU practice.

Likely Priorities: Favor mediation and caution while avoiding headline-driven recognition.

Red Lines: A fractured summit with no coherent follow-up mechanism.

Gambia

Strategic Interests: Rules-based diplomacy, small-state predictability, and peaceful dispute resolution.

Likely Priorities: Insist on legal clarity and broad consensus before any status innovation.

Red Lines: A politically improvised decision lacking legal discipline.

Ghana

Strategic Interests: Rule of law, democratic legitimacy, and responsible continental precedent.

Likely Priorities: Demand serious legal argument, democratic benchmarks, and strong AU stewardship.

Red Lines: Any outcome that is neither legally principled nor practically implementable.

Guinea

Strategic Interests: Sovereignty protection, regional stability, and restrained diplomacy.

Likely Priorities: Lean toward territorial integrity while leaving room for AU-managed dialogue.

Red Lines: Recognition that arrives before continental consensus and security planning.

Guinea-Bissau

Strategic Interests: Institutional calm, conflict avoidance, and AU procedural coherence.

Likely Priorities: Support mediation and technical review over sudden recognition.

Red Lines: A summit decision that increases diplomatic volatility without enforcement capacity.

Kenya

Strategic Interests: Horn stability, trade access, and pragmatic regional engagement.

Likely Priorities: Balance Somali sovereignty concerns with the need to address long-term de facto realities.

Red Lines: A rigid outcome that ignores regional practicalities and future mediation needs.

Lesotho

Strategic Interests: Respect for sovereignty, legal clarity, and protection of small-state order.

Likely Priorities: Favor AU consensus and conservative treatment of recognition claims.

Red Lines: An exception that is too vaguely framed to remain exceptional.

Liberia

Strategic Interests: Continental legal order, democratic governance, and institutional prudence.

Likely Priorities: Seek a principled debate that weighs both statehood criteria and sovereignty concerns.

Red Lines: A resolution driven purely by security bargaining with no legal foundation.

Libya

Strategic Interests: Territorial integrity, state continuity, and caution around fragmentation.

Likely Priorities: Stress sovereignty-first principles and resist expansive precedents.

Red Lines: Any language normalizing breakaway recognition amid wider regional disorder.

Madagascar

Strategic Interests: Political stability, multilateral procedure, and geographic neutrality.

Likely Priorities: Back careful legal review and process discipline.

Red Lines: A rushed choice that forces states into binary camps without safeguards.

Malawi

Strategic Interests: Predictable continental norms and institutional moderation.

Likely Priorities: Support negotiated outcomes and narrow legal reasoning.

Red Lines: A recognition move detached from continent-wide precedent concerns.

Mali

Strategic Interests: Sovereignty, anti-fragmentation logic, and resistance to external pressure.

Likely Priorities: Defend territorial integrity and criticize outside actors reshaping African borders.

Red Lines: Any resolution read as rewarding separatist momentum.

Mauritania

Strategic Interests: Sahel-Horn stability, legal caution, and diplomatic balance.

Likely Priorities: Prefer de-escalation, AU-led mediation, and conservative status language.

Red Lines: A decision that radicalizes Somalia-Somaliland relations or invites outside competition.

Mauritius

Strategic Interests: Rules-based order, stability of recognition practice, and careful diplomacy.

Likely Priorities: Support a structured process with clear benchmarks rather than emotional argument.

Red Lines: A summit outcome lacking procedural safeguards or implementation steps.

Morocco

Strategic Interests: Territorial integrity, anti-secession logic, and strategic diplomacy.

Likely Priorities: Defend sovereignty norms and oppose recognition paths that could broaden separatist precedent.

Red Lines: Any AU move that weakens the principle against unilateral secession.

Mozambique

Strategic Interests: State unity, security management, and stability-focused regionalism.

Likely Priorities: Favor Somalia's territorial integrity and strong AU control over process.

Red Lines: Recognition without overwhelming legal and political justification.

Namibia

Strategic Interests: International law, decolonization history, and disciplined multilateralism.

Likely Priorities: Demand coherent legal standards and careful use of colonial-boundary arguments.

Red Lines: Selective legal reasoning that appears opportunistic rather than principled.

Niger

Strategic Interests: Sovereignty, anti-fragmentation policy, and suspicion of outside agendas.

Likely Priorities: Lean strongly toward territorial integrity and AU non-recognition.

Red Lines: A compromise that creates exploitable precedent for other separatist claims.

Nigeria

Strategic Interests: Continental leadership, anti-secession precedent, and regional stability.

Likely Priorities: Defend sovereignty while preserving AU capacity to mediate political realities.

Red Lines: Any straightforward recognition path with weak continent-wide safeguards.

Rwanda

Strategic Interests: Institutional effectiveness, precedent management, and disciplined decision-making.

Likely Priorities: Push for a clear, actionable outcome rather than symbolic rhetoric.

Red Lines: A vague communique that postpones the issue without reducing risk.

Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic

Strategic Interests: Self-determination discourse, decolonization claims, and AU consistency.

Likely Priorities: Argue that the chamber must explain why some claims are heard and others excluded.

Red Lines: An outcome that invokes sovereignty selectively while ignoring contested historical cases.

São Tomé and Príncipe

Strategic Interests: Small-state legal predictability and multilateral stability.

Likely Priorities: Support procedural rigor, calm debate, and tightly framed recommendations.

Red Lines: A politicized decision unsupported by legal reasoning.

Senegal

Strategic Interests: Regional order, mediation credibility, and institutional legitimacy.

Likely Priorities: Look for a consensus formula that protects sovereignty while opening controlled diplomacy.

Red Lines: A chamber split that damages AU authority in West and East Africa alike.

Seychelles

Strategic Interests: Maritime security, Red Sea stability, and rules-based diplomacy.

Likely Priorities: Encourage careful review of security consequences and shipping implications.

Red Lines: A decision that destabilizes maritime routes without a mitigation plan.

Sierra Leone

Strategic Interests: Conflict prevention, legal clarity, and predictable AU mechanisms.

Likely Priorities: Support a principled, implementation-ready decision.

Red Lines: A summit result that is morally forceful but operationally empty.

Somalia

Strategic Interests: National unity, territorial integrity, and rejection of any challenge to sovereignty.

Likely Priorities: Block recognition, reject legal exceptionalism, and secure explicit AU reaffirmation of Somali unity.

Red Lines: Any wording that treats Somaliland as a legitimate candidate for sovereign recognition.

South Africa

Strategic Interests: Pan-African legal consistency, negotiated settlement, and institutional legitimacy.

Likely Priorities: Interrogate both decolonization and sovereignty arguments while preferring an African-led mediated outcome.

Red Lines: A simplistic binary choice that ignores legal complexity and continental precedent.

South Sudan

Strategic Interests: Sensitivity to self-determination narratives alongside concern for regional order.

Likely Priorities: Approach the issue cautiously, mindful of both secession history and destabilizing precedent.

Red Lines: A doctrinaire position that ignores conflict realities on the ground.

Sudan

Strategic Interests: State continuity, territorial integrity, and cautious regional diplomacy.

Likely Priorities: Favor conservative sovereignty language and oppose rapid recognition moves.

Red Lines: Any step that appears to normalize partitionist politics.

Tanzania

Strategic Interests: Regional stability, AU-led mediation, and respect for sovereign equality.

Likely Priorities: Seek a calm compromise that prevents escalation and preserves continental norms.

Red Lines: A hasty legal conclusion without broad African ownership.

Togo

Strategic Interests: Institutional order, peaceful dispute management, and summit coherence.

Likely Priorities: Support legal clarity and manageable implementation pathways.

Red Lines: A resolution that is impossible to operationalize after adoption.

Tunisia

Strategic Interests: Rules-based diplomacy, North African stability, and legal precision.

Likely Priorities: Demand tightly reasoned legal language and caution on precedent.

Red Lines: Any resolution whose wording can be read multiple contradictory ways.

Uganda

Strategic Interests: Regional security, pragmatic politics, and AU authority in the Horn.

Likely Priorities: Balance anti-fragmentation concerns with the need for realistic conflict management.

Red Lines: A decision that weakens AU leverage over future negotiations.

Zambia

Strategic Interests: Predictable continental norms, peaceful diplomacy, and legal restraint.

Likely Priorities: Favor consensus, disciplined process, and conservative recognition thresholds.

Red Lines: An emotionally driven outcome detached from long-term precedent.

Zimbabwe

Strategic Interests: Sovereignty, anti-intervention norms, and continental political autonomy.

Likely Priorities: Reject outside pressure, emphasize territorial integrity, and keep recognition tightly controlled.

Red Lines: Any decision that appears to let non-African actors redraw African political maps.

8. Research Questions for Delegates

What minimum legal and political criteria should the African Union require before it even considers revisiting Somaliland's status?

Should respect for colonial borders at independence be interpreted as supporting Somalia's territorial integrity or Somaliland's claim to the former British Somaliland boundary?

How should your delegation balance democratic performance and de facto governance against the risks of legitimizing unilateral secession?

Would your state support categorical rejection, conditional review, or an AU-mediated process without status recognition?

What role should IGAD, neighboring states, and outside powers play, if any, in shaping the final AU decision?

What public communication strategy should accompany the summit's final decision to preserve continental legitimacy and reduce regional escalation?

9. Suggested Resolution Architecture

A. Immediate process language

Affirm the Assembly’s competence; define the legal and political questions under review; authorize emergency legal memoranda and regional consultations.

B. Territorial integrity pathway

If the chamber rejects Somaliland’s claim, restate support for Somalia’s sovereignty while mandating confidence-building measures and structured talks on governance, representation, and security.

C. Conditional review pathway

If the chamber seeks a middle course, establish a tightly bounded AU review panel to assess whether Somaliland constitutes an exceptional case without predetermining recognition.

D. Security and mediation safeguards

Require consultation with IGAD, neighboring states, and AU peace and security mechanisms to reduce escalation risks around ports, borders, and armed actors.

E. Institutional credibility measures

Mandate a transparent explanatory statement clarifying why the final decision does or does not create precedent for other separatist claims.

10. Glossary and Source Note

Term	Meaning
Statehood	The claim that an entity possesses the legal and practical attributes of a sovereign state.
Recognition	The political and diplomatic act by which other states or organizations acknowledge an entity as a state.
Territorial integrity	The principle that an existing state’s borders and sovereignty should not be altered unilaterally.
Uti possidetis / inherited borders	The decolonization principle reflected in African practice that borders at independence should be respected to avoid wider conflict.
De facto state	An entity that exercises effective control over territory and institutions without broad formal international recognition.
Remedial secession	A contested argument that a people may be justified in separating from a parent state after grave and sustained denial of rights or protection.

Source note: African Union membership, legal principles, and recent public statements were adapted into the same educational Model UN guide structure as the uploaded IOC background guide. Real-world reference points include the African Union’s official member-state list, the AU Constitutive Act’s principle of respect for borders existing on achievement of independence, and the AU Commission’s December 2025 reaffirmation of Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity. The 2027 summit timeline, freeze-date events, and delegate position summaries are fictionalized for educational simulation.